![]() There have been some attempts to re-implement prover interfaces in big IDE frameworks, while keeping the old interaction model. Even well-known Emacs modes for such provers follow this synchronous model based on single commands with immediate response, meaning that the editor waits for the prover after each command. We thus show that Isabelle is a suitable platform for critical systems assurance.Īfter several decades, most proof assistants are still centered around TTY-based interaction in a tight read-eval-print loop. We embed its functional specification into Isabelle, verify its security requirements, and form a modular security case in Isabelle/SACM that combines the heterogeneous artifacts. To validate our approach, we present a substantial case study based on the Tokeneer secure entry system benchmark. ![]() In particular, Isabelle brings a diverse range of automated verification techniques that can provide evidence. The use of Isabelle/SACM guarantees well-formedness, consistency, and traceability of assurance cases, and allows a tight integration of formal and informal evidence of various provenance. ![]() In this paper, we contribute a formal machine-checked interactive language, called Isabelle/SACM, supporting the computer-assisted construction of assurance cases compliant with the OMG Structured Assurance Case Meta-Model. Consequently, assurance techniques should support both formal and informal artifacts, with explicated inferential links between them. However, assurance cases can never be fully formalised, as the use of formal methods is contingent on models that are validated by informal processes. The use of formal methods in assurance can improve automation, increase confidence, and overcome errant reasoning. ![]() Assurance cases are often required to certify critical systems. ![]()
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